How Does the
Predictive Processing Model Account for Kohut’s Concept of the dissolution of
the self?
In this post, I will try to understand Kohut’s concept of
“self-dissolution” through concepts drawn from cognitive theories of predictive
processing.
Arieh Green quotes Kohut as writing that dissolution is “a higher state
of transformation in which the self exists in a transpersonal state of
consciousness characterized by unified wholeness, as a mode of being that
transcends itself toward ‘a participatory transpersonal existence in the
universe’” (Kohut, 1966). “This is a state of consciousness lacking any defined
mental form, essentially non-structural, constituting an empty potential,
devoid of content, for an infinite range of modes of existence.”
Dafna Hominer writes that dissolution is “a conscious choice to
relinquish existence as a particular subject who needs mirroring from the
environment, and to choose an alternative mode of existence in which the self
is constituted through giving to the other as such, rather than through a
reciprocal relationship of ‘give and take.’”
Arieh Green also writes that Kohut defines “cosmic narcissism” as “a
mode of being that transcends itself in favor of ‘transpersonal participation
in the universe.’” There is apparently an identity, or at least a considerable
similarity, between the concept of “cosmic narcissism” and that of
“self-dissolution.” But how are we to understand these difficult definitions of
self-dissolution?
In my own words, I
would say that dissolution may be a kind of “suspension of the self” in order
to focus on something else. Outside the therapeutic context, I think
that an athlete who concentrates on the routine they are about to perform,
while suspending thoughts about the self, such as “Will I succeed?”, “Will I
mess up in front of this entire audience?”, or “What will people think of me?”,
is in a state of self-dissolution. The same may be true of a musician who
concentrates on the piece they are about to perform while suspending similar
thoughts, such as “Will I forget the notes halfway through the piece?” or “Will
I manage not to make a mistake this time at the point where I always get
confused?”
In the cognitive
literature, this state is also described using the concept of flow.
Flow is an experiential
state that occurs when a person approaches optimal engagement with a task.
In a state of flow, the person is completely absorbed in the task. The demands
of the task and the person’s abilities are well matched, so that the person
experiences neither boredom on the one hand nor a level of difficulty that
exceeds their abilities on the other (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2009).
Martha Argerich in Flow
In the therapeutic context, dissolution may be a state in which the
therapist is absorbed in the client or clients before them, while suspending
thoughts about the self, such as “Will I manage to say the right thing to the
clients?” or “Did my son take a key, and will he be able to get into the
house?” In a state of
self-dissolution, the therapist encounters the clients “without memory or
desire,” as Bion put it.
In the article cited below, George Deane proposes another
conceptualization of self-dissolution, one related to the theory of predictive
processing. According to this theory, the brain constantly generates
predictions about the sources of the signals it will receive from the senses.
These predictions are the brain’s best guess, its best hypothesis, about the
sources, namely the objects in the world, from which the sensory data
originate. The brain generates these predictions on the basis of its
expectations and beliefs about how the world is structured, that is, on the
basis of its consolidated body of knowledge.
These predictions “flow downward” toward the sensory organs and
influence the way in which sensory signals are received. When there is a good
match between the predictions and what is actually registered by the senses,
everything is fine: the prediction has succeeded. The world really is as we
predicted it would be.
When there is a mismatch between the predictions and what is actually
registered by the senses, data concerning prediction errors “flow upward” from
the sensory organs toward the brain. These prediction errors represent the
differences between what the brain predicted and what the sensory organs
received. Prediction errors lead to small changes in the predictions so that
they will correspond more closely to what exists in reality.
Because the predictions are based on our models of reality, that is, on
our consolidated knowledge, prediction errors produce changes in these models
and in our consolidated knowledge. In other words, they produce learning. The
brain’s aim is to minimize prediction errors as far as possible. It strives to
reach a state in which it perfectly predicts the sources of the signals it
receives from the senses. Cycles of prediction and error correction therefore
occur continuously.
This means that what we perceive is determined by our predictions just
as much as by the signals reaching our senses from the objects we perceive. The
predictions that “flow downward” toward the sensory organs are rich in content,
whereas the sensory information that “flows upward” consists only of error
signals.
The rich prediction that flows downward enables us to know what is
present in the world, to “perceive” the world even before it is actually
registered by our senses. If this theory is correct, the role of sensory
contact with the world is merely to test the brain’s best guess about what is
out there and, when necessary, to correct it. According to this approach, our
predictions are the principal source of all the contents of our perceptions,
even though these contents are continuously tested and corrected by the
prediction errors generated in response to sensory input.
George Deane argues
that the brain predicts the world only as a means to the end of preserving the
body. Having a body is therefore one of the fundamental aspects of the
experience of being a self. In other words, there is no self without a body.
The self is created so that the body can continue to survive.
The entire purpose of sampling the world through the senses is to enable
the organism, in this case the human being, to act in the world and to bring
sensory input into alignment with its internal model. When a person samples the
world, they therefore do so with a sense of agency, a sense of acting in the
world or of being capable of acting in the world in order to alter sensory
input.
In order to survive over time and navigate the world, a person must be
capable of predicting the consequences of their actions over different
timescales: short, medium, and long. A rich model of the self, including what I
can do over different timescales and what the consequences of different courses
of action will be for my future condition over those timescales, makes it
possible to predict the outcomes of various possible actions.
Friston, the
principal theoretician of the predictive processing model, argues that
consciousness is inference about the future, about the future consequences of
my actions in the world. If we identify consciousness with the self, then the
self is a set of predictions concerning the possibilities for action available
to me over different future timescales.
When does self-dissolution occur? In states in which the influence of
predictions flowing “from the top down” is reduced or weakened, for example
under the influence of psychedelic drugs, a sense of being unable to affect the
world emerges. If my ability to predict what I will perceive through my senses
in the next moment, or what will happen in the world in the next moment, is
weakened, then my ability to plan an action and influence the world is also
weakened.
When predictive ability is weakened, anything is possible; anything can
happen. I have no set of expectations telling me that something is impossible
or falls outside what I anticipated. If nothing violates my expectations
because there are no expectations, there is no need to act in order to correct
the deviation and bring the sensory data into alignment with the prediction.
Thus, when the
influence of predictions is weak, there is a reduction in the sense of agency.
This reduction in agency undermines the sense of self, and this is
self-dissolution. The weakening of predictions also causes a “collapse”
of the sense of time. Predictions enable us to anticipate the consequences of
our actions over different timescales. But if we have no predictive capacity,
then we have no sense of time. This, too, is an aspect of self-dissolution.
It may be that, in the therapeutic context, when the therapist comes to
the session “without memory or desire,” they are voluntarily reducing their
degree of confidence in their predictions about what will happen during the
session. The therapist is less preoccupied with what the client will probably
say or do and with how the therapist will respond.
The therapist places themselves in a state in which they are open to
every possibility, every idea, and every thought expressed by the client. The
reduction in the therapist’s predictive confidence may to some extent reduce
their sense of agency and may also cause a “collapse” of their sense of time
during the session. In this way, the therapist experiences self-dissolution,
becomes absorbed in the client, and perhaps the therapist and client even
become absorbed together in a state of flow.
Deane, G. (2020). Dissolving the self. Philosophy and the Mind
Sciences, 1(I), 1–27. https://www.philosophymindscience.org/index.php/phimisci/article/view/39
Hominer, Dafna. “On the Difference Between Submission, Surrender, and
Dissolution: A Review of a Lecture by Dr. Gabi Mann as Part of the Meetings
Together Series.” From the website of the Israel Association for Self
Psychology and the Study of Subjectivity: https://selfpsychology.org.il/
Green, Arieh. “Revelation and Concealment of the Face: Life and Death,
Finitude and Infinity: Transformation of Selfhood in Coping with the Trauma of
Loss.” From the website of the Israel Association for Self Psychology and the
Study of Subjectivity: https://selfpsychology.org.il/
Nakamura, J., & Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2009). Flow theory and
research (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
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